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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the decisions in New York is almost -an exact reproduction
of that of the Pennsylvania cases. Since the decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York in Matter of Swift, 137
N. Y. 86, 32 N. E. 1096, it has been settled that where there
is an equitable conversion by will of realty owned by a resident testator in a sister state, such equitable conversion
will not subject the property to a transfer inheritance tax.
The doctrine of this case, which was based on the theory
that taxation is based on facts, and not legal and equitable
fictions, was extended to include an attempted tax on contracts for the sale of land in another state, in the cases of
In re Baker's Estate, 124 N. Y. S. 827 and In re Wolcott's
Estate, 157 N. Y. S. 268.
Pennsylvania, by the decision of its Supreme Court in
Paul's Estate, is apparently following these New York decisions, though the latter two, being lower court cases, are
not mentioned anywhere in the Court's opinion. At the
present time, then, it is safe to say that in Pa. where a
resident testator, prior to his death had owned real property in another state, for which he had executed contracts
of sale, the unpaid purchase price on those contracts at the
time of his death does not constitute personal property
taxable as such. an equitable conversion of the realty to
personalty by the executed contracts not being enough to
give Pa. the right to tax the interests as such.
A search of decided cases fails to reveal any cases
other than the New York cases discussed, which are directly analogous to the case of Paul's Estate.
ROBERT E. KNUPP.

IMPLIED WARRANTY AS BETWEEN
MANUFACTURER AND CONSUMER
There is a considerable conflict in authority as to
whether an action can be maintained directly against a
manufacturer of a defective article for an injury to the
ultimate consumer who purchased from a middleman, and
if so, whether this action should be in trespass for the tort
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or in assumpsit for breach of an implied warranty. There
seems to be no doubt that an action on the tort will lie.
In Pennsylvania the case of Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca
Cola Bottling Co.," settles this principle. The facts were
that a dealer sold a bottle of coca cola, removed the cap
and handed it to the plaintiff, who was injured by swallowing ground glass. In this case the plaintiff was allowed
to recover three thousand dollars in trespass for the
negligence from the manufacturer. Could such a plaintiff
recover in an action of assumpsit against the manufacturer? This question in many cases has been related so closely to the question of negligence that the decisions are not
always susceptible of clear classification.2
In the case of Birmingham Chero Cola Bottling Co. v.
Clark,3 it was held that one who purchases from a retailer
a bottled beverage and who is -made ill by the presence of
a fly in it cannot maintain an action upon the implied
warranty. But, in the case of Davis v. Van Camp Packing
Co.,' it was held that one who puts up food to be sold
through dealers for human consumption impliedly warrants
that it is not deleterious and is liable to a consumer injured
by eating food not fit for human consumption and the question of privity of contract is not controlling.
In an article entitled "Necessity of Privity of Contract
in Warranty by Representation" it is said in substance
that if the liability of warranty is to be imposed on the
original vendor or manufacturer it must spring from representations directed to the ultimate consumer. Such representations may be accomplished by advertising, branding, canvassing, sampling, etc., and by putting food on the
market for sale in the original packages. In the latter
case the manufacturer alone is able to protect the consumer from injury and by his invitation to purchase requires the reliance of the consumer. The remedies of the
1296 Pa. 114.

A. L. R. 709.
3205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64.
'176 N. W. 382 (Iowa).
542 Harvard Law Review 414.
217

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
injured consumer ought not be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales and the obligations of the
manufacturers should not be based alone on privity of
contract but on the sound demands of social justice.
In the recent case of Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works,6
the plaintiff purchased a bottle of coca cola from a retailer,
who took the bottle from the ice chest, removed the cap
and handed it to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was
drinking its contents, she became conscious of a creeping
sensation on her lips, which proved to be a worm that
had been in the bottle. The plaintiff brought an action of
assumpsit for injuries from foreign substance in the bottled beverage and recovered five hundred dollars in the
lower court. On appeal the defendant contended that
assumpsit was the wrong action. The court below said the
plaintiff could waive the tort and sue in assumpsit and
recover under the act of May 4, 18891 providing that, "In
every sale of green, salted, pickled or smoked meats, lard
and other articles of merchandise used wholly or in part
for food, said goods or merchandise shall correspond in
kind and quality with the description given either orally or
in writing, by the vendor; and in every sale of such goods
or merchandise, unless the parties shall agree otherwise,
there shall be an implied contract or undertaking that the
goods or merchandise are sound and fit for household consumption." But the upper court said food does not include drink.8 The action therefore cannot be upheld on
this ground but the upper court sustains it on other
grounds. The court admits the decisions are in confusion
in this class of cases. Some courts base this sort of action
on negligence alone; others on implied warranty; still
others say if implied warranty exists it does not extend
6102 Pa. Super. Ct. 515.
7Act of May 4, 1889, P. L. 87, Sec. 1.
&Commonwealth v. Kebort, 212 Pa. 289; Commonwealth v.
Pflaum, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 55 and 236 Pa. 294; Webster's definition of
food is "nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an
organism for purposes of growth or repair and for the maintenance
of the vital processes".
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to third parties. It is generally conceded that a tort action
could have been brought but the question is whether that
remedy is exclusive. The question presented specifically is
whether or not assumpsit based on implied warranty of
fitness may be maintained by the ultimate consumer, who
bought from a dealer, against the manufacturer.
The general rule in 26 Corpus Juris 783 is that in all
sales by a dealer of food or beverages for immediate consumption there is an implied warranty of fitness or wholesomeness for the consumer. A substantial weight of
authority holds that assumpsit will lie. 9
In Catani v. Swift Co.,10 an action of trespass was
brought by the consumer against the manufacturer for diseased food and Justice Frazier said "That where the sale
of articles of food is for immediate consumption there is an
implied warranty that the food is wholesome and fit for the
purpose intended, irrespective of the seller's knowledge of
disease or defects therein."
The court in the Nock Case says that the sound principle of law is that in a sale of food or beverages there is
an implied warranty that it shall be free of a foreign substance which may be injurious to the well being of the
consumer. There is no good reasoh why sales of food and
beverages intended for human consumption should not
carry with it the implied warranty that it is suitable and
wholesome. By Section 15 of the Sales Act"' an implied
warranty as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose
may be annexed by usage of trade and nothing is clearer
than that coca cola is exclusively made for the purpose of
drinking.
Next the court says that assuming the action of assumpsit is improperly brought, it will not reverse it on
9

Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W.
155; Craft v. Parker and Co., 96 Mich. 245, 55 N. W. 812; Boyd v.
Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80; Truschel v.
Dean, 77 Ark. 546, 92 S. W. 781; Bunch v. Weil, 72 Ark. 343, 80 S. W.

582; Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark., 354, 90 S. W. 288; Walters v. United Grocery Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473.
10251 Pa. 52.
"tAct of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543 Sec. 15.
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such a formal ground notwithstanding the fact the case
was tried as if brought in trespass without objection to the
form of action. Trial on the merits waives the pleadings;
but are we to suppose that this objection could have been
raised in the court below before trial on its merits? That
is the question which is still unanswered. Or does this
expression mean that implied warranty is a good cause of
action, but even if not, it cannot be attacked now? The
latter is probably what the court meant.
The question is raised whether there must be privity of
contract. The court says ordinarily a manufacturer may
not be liable to those with whom he has no contractual
relation but if he puts goods on the market in a bottle,
can, or an original package, he in effect represents to each
purchaser the contents thereof are wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which they are sold and the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply. The
plaintiff could maintain his action on implied warranty
12
even though an element of tort was mixed in with it.
After the Nock Case the law in Pennsylvania seems to
be that a manufacturer of beverages contained in sealed
bottles is liable in an action of assumpsit for injuries sustained by a purchaser because of a foreign substance in
the bottle; and that in all cases of sales of food or beverages for immediate consumption, there is an implied warranty of fitness or wholesomeness for the consumer upon
which the latter may sue the manufacturer in assumpsit
for injuries sustained.
ELIZABETH LADNER McCULLOUGH.
l2 Coyle v. Schnell, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 386; Cowan v. Nagel, 89
Pa. 122; Carry v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 194 Pa. 516; Parry v. The

nirst National Bank of Lansford, 270 Pa. 556.

